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Abstract 
We consider the functions of proof in mathematics from the perspective of the work of the 
mathematics teacher. The work of proving and the time spent on proving, what can a teacher 
account it to? How can he or she justify it? We frame that problem in a descriptive theory of 
teaching and place within that frame the work of scholars who have inquired on the function of 
proof in mathematics. We argue that the multiple functions that proof plays in mathematics are 
resources that a teacher could use to account for the work of proving. We describe how the 
functions of proof identified in the literature can assist the work of the teacher and illustrate the 
role these functions of proof can play using classroom scenarios that showcase the work of 
proving. Since the teacher is not only accountable to mathematics but also accountable to 
students’ learning of that mathematics some times work is valuable because it helps represent 
important mathematical knowledge, sometimes because it helps students acquire, or demonstrate 
they have, knowledge. The existence of these different sources of value is not only a resource for 
the teacher to value diverse work but also permits to anticipate management dilemmas 
concerning the different ways of accounting for the work of proving. 
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Revisiting the functions of proof in mathematics classrooms:  
A view from a theory of instructional exchanges 
 




The purpose of this paper is to provide an instruction-based frame to the question, often 
asked in mathematics education, of what the functions of proof are in a classroom. We take aim 
at a problem of teaching: The work of proving and the time spent on proving, what can a teacher 
account it to? How can he or she justify it? We frame that problem in a descriptive theory of 
teaching and place within that frame the work of scholars who have inquired on the function of 
proof in mathematics (Bell, 1976; Hanna, 1990; de Villiers, 1990). We argue that the multiple 
functions that proof plays in mathematics are resources that a teacher could use to account for the 
work of proving. We describe how the functions of proof identified in the literature can assist the 
work of the teacher. Yet the teacher is not only accountable to mathematics when accounting for 
classroom work; she is also accountable to students’ learning of that mathematics. Those two 
demands for accountability provide different figurative currencies with which to value what is 
done in the classroom: Some times work is valuable because it helps represent important 
mathematical knowledge, sometimes because it helps students acquire, or demonstrate they have, 
knowledge. The existence of these two currencies is not only a resource for the teacher to value 
diverse work but also permits to anticipate management dilemmas concerning the different ways 
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of accounting for the work of proving. We illustrate how a teacher could account for the work of 
proving using scenarios of geometry instruction produced as animations of cartoon characters. 
We use a reconsideration of functions of proof in mathematics to show how these could provide 
currency for the teacher to value different kinds of mathematical work. The scenarios also permit 
to anticipate the different dilemmas a teacher might need to contend with by virtue of being 
accountable not only to mathematics but also to students’ learning. In particular we illustrate 
how these dilemmas could undercut the possibility that certain kinds of mathematical work be 
done in the classroom.  While this article presents a conceptual discussion and illustrations, a 
subsequent submission examines empirical data from teachers’ responses to those scenarios; 
such data informs about teachers’ perceptions of those dilemmas and tensions.  
 Several have written about the function of proof in mathematics, taking as background 
the usual logical (or philosophical) reason, according to which a proof confers truth to a 
statement. That “verification” function of proof is also, often interpreted in subjective terms, 
equating the truth of a statement with an individual’s belief in the truth of a statement and thus 
allocating proof a role in the subjective acquisition of such belief. Along those lines proof has 
been described as ascertaining for oneself or persuading others, convincing oneself, a friend, or 
an enemy, about the truth of a statement (Harel & Sowder, 1998; Inglis & Mejía Ramos, 2009; 
Mason, 1982). Duval (2002) has alluded to these two ways of reading the relationship between 
proof and knowledge, by saying that a proof can change the logical value as well as epistemic 
value of a statement: that is a proof may logically validate a statement, but it can also affect the 
belief of the cognizing subject on the truth of the statement.  
Those two functions of proof—to convince individuals and to establish results in the 
field—while apt to justify why proof deserves a place in mathematics classrooms, are by no 
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means the only functions of proof in mathematical activity. Mathematics education scholars have 
contributed to such elaboration on the functions of proof both by reflecting on its many roles in 
the discipline of mathematics and by identifying its roles in human understanding. From these 
roles researchers have derived recommendations for the direction of teaching in classrooms. 
Thus Hanna, (2000), Hersh, (1993), and (Knuth, 2002) have argued that proof has a role as a tool 
for promoting mathematical understanding in students. On the other hand, historically and at 
least in selected places in the curriculum (such as in the teaching of Euclidean geometry), proof 
has had a natural place in the communication of mathematical knowledge: The mathematical text 
to be communicated included proofs along with the statements of theorems. At least in the 
United States but also in other countries, the study of geometry has been a place where students 
have been charged with producing proofs  (Herbst, 2002). The implementation of calls, such as 
NCTM’s (2000), to extend the place of proof to more of the curriculum run into the issue of how 
a teacher may account for attention to the work of proving. While the argument has traditionally 
been that proof is central to mathematical work, this paper attempts to unpack that argument by 
inquiring into the different roles that proof plays in mathematical work and how those might 
apply to the mathematics classroom. We take as our charge to organize this field by embedding 
those various roles within an explicit treatment of the teacher’s role as manager of instruction.  
 
A Theoretical Perspective on Instruction and the Work of Teaching 
 We propose that mathematics instruction proceeds as a sequence of exchanges or 
transactions between, on the one hand, the moment-to-moment, possibly interactive work that 
students do with their teacher and on the other hand, the discrete claims a teacher can lay on 
what has been accomplished. Central to this theory of instructional exchanges is the notion of 
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didactical contract (Brousseau, 1997): The hypothesis that a bond exists that makes teacher and 
students mutually responsible vis-à-vis their relationships with knowledge. In particular, a 
contract exists that makes the teacher responsible to attend not only to the student as learner of 
mathematics but also to mathematics as the discipline to be represented so that it can be learned. 
A descriptive, general hypothesis of our theory is that one such contract exists in any instance of 
institutionalized mathematics instruction. Particular classrooms may have specific customary 
ways of negotiating and enacting that contract and those may vary quite a bit, but we expect they 
will always include specific ways in which the teacher is held accountable not only to the 
students’ insofar as learners of mathematics but also to mathematics as the discipline to be 
represented for its learning.   
 A second, related hypothesis helps us observe the work of the teacher in instruction. This 
hypothesis derives from the observation that classroom activity takes place in multiple 
timescales: While meaningful classroom interactions can be detected at a timescale of the 
fraction of a second, progress in the syllabus and consequential examinations take place in a 
larger timescale, of months and marking periods in a year. Thus, the second key hypothesis is 
that the work of the teacher includes managing activities and objects in two different timescales: 
the work done moment-to-moment (at the scale of the utterance) and the mathematical objects of 
knowledge, which exist at the larger scales of the month, semester- or year-long curriculum 
(Lemke, 2000, p. 277). In other words, we hypothesize that a teacher needs to operate symbolic 
transactions or exchanges between activities in one timescale and objects of knowledge in the 
other: activities at the scale of moment-to-moment interaction serve the teacher to deploy or 
instantiate mathematical objects of knowledge and reciprocally objects of knowledge serve to 
account for the activities done moment-to-moment. Further, we posit that this exchange is 
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complicated because, after the first hypothesis, the expression “mathematical objects of 
knowledge” contains two kinds of contractual implications: on the one hand objects of 
knowledge need to be represented so as to be available for study and learning by students, and 
on the other hand students need to learn them, eventually come to know them. While the 
relationship between those two elements is often seen as linear—namely knowledge 
representations are objects of study and learning, eventually being known by students—the 
notion that a didactical contract exists underscores the bidirectional nature of that relationship: 
Since students have to learn, the process of instruction includes making representations of 
knowledge that can be learnt by those students. Transformations and transpositions of the 
knowledge to be learned happen partly in response to the need for that knowledge to be learned 
(Chevallard, 1991).  
 A consequence of those hypotheses is that as the mathematics teacher manages 
exchanges between the mathematical work done and the objects of knowledge to lay claim on, 
she needs to attend to two complementary sets of values or two currencies. The work done needs 
to be accounted for as representation or embodiment of mathematical ideas (or practices) at 
stake in the contract.5 And the work needs to be accounted for as students’ actual learning of the 
ideas that they have contracted upon. The value of the work done can be assessed in each of 
those currencies. Of course we don’t mean to say that every bit of interactive work done 
necessarily has to be valuable in both currencies; what we say is that the teacher has two 
currencies with which they may give value to classroom work: One currency consists of claims 
                                                
5 This latter exchange contains two assumptions. One of them, likely to be unproblematic among mathematics 
educators is that the teacher is accountable to the discipline of mathematics for representing the subject matter. The 
other assumption is that such representation is achieved in and through interactive work: Knowledge is not only 
represented in the texts that students use or in what the teacher says but more generally in the discourse that is 
publicly created by humans, through language and with artifacts. The notion that a piece of knowledge may be 
represented through the coordination of multiple players is not only apparent in the traditional philosophical 
dialogue (as in Plato’s works) but also in orchestral music, dance, theater, and film. 
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on the representation of knowledge and the other currency consists of claims on students’ 
learning of that knowledge. A particular chunk of classroom work may be of high exchange 
value on one and low (or perhaps also high) on the other of those two currencies. 
  In describing the work of the teacher as one of managing exchanges between work done 
in interaction and objects contracted upon we therefore allude to the need for the teacher to 






Figure 1. Instructional Exchanges. 
 
 In what follows we apply this framework to examine the functions of proof in the 
classroom. With this we mean to say we examine how a teacher might account for the work of 
proof. In this paper we leave the expression “the work of proof” somewhat vague, to mean any 
classroom performance that an observer (including the teacher) might describe by an appeal to 
the label “proof” (but see Herbst & Balacheff, 2009, for a more precise way of describing the 
work of proof). As noted above many kinds of work observable in the classroom might be 
described with the label “proof;” from the reproduction of what Euclid wrote after stating the 
Pythagorean proposition to the reasoning followed by a student as he derives a plausible 
conclusion from a statement. Our argument is that these varying kinds of work may fulfill one or 
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on proof, and thus a teacher may account for them, or value them using different value tokens.  
Our general claim is that the various “functions” or “roles” of proof in mathematics constitute a 
set of tokens that a teacher may use to allocate value to classroom performances. Those tokens 
could be available for a teacher to value classroom performances, though the extent to which 
teachers perceive and appreciate those values is an empirical question, which we take on in the 
companion piece to this article. 
 
Functions of Proof and their Role in Instructional Exchanges  
 In this section we revisit each of the functions of proof that has been identified in the 
literature and unpack the theory of instructional exchanges to explain how each of these 
functions of proof might play a role in the practice of instruction. We exemplify how each of 
these functions of proof could be used to put a value on classroom performances by using them 
to inspect classroom scenarios in a common course of studies, the traditional high school 
geometry course in the United States. These scenarios have been represented in animated movies 
that were created by project ThEMaT (Thought Experiments in Mathematics Teaching) to 
facilitate thought experiments with teachers about what could happen in this course (see Herbst 
& Miyakawa, 2008; Herbst, Nachlieli, and Chazan, in revision, for more information on those 
animations). Like video records of classroom episodes, animations can be used to spur 
conversations among practitioners about practice; unlike classroom episodes, animated scenarios 
can be designed to showcase practices that might be rare in actual classrooms. The animations 
don’t mean to claim that such practices exist; rather, they mean to showcase what the practices 
could look like so as to ground their consideration by the theory of instructional exchanges.   
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The work of proving may count as verification of or conviction about the truth of a statement 
Mathematical statements don’t go without saying in the discipline of mathematics as they 
might, for example, in revealed or mystical knowledge. They are claimed to be true and their 
truth can be verified or refuted. Thus in the classroom the work of proving could be accounted 
for as accomplishing the verification of a statement. The management work of the teacher, 
effecting a transaction of the work done for the claim that the truth of a statement is known, 
includes not only attesting that the claim has been verified but also that students are convinced of 
the truth of the statement.  
Philosophy of science has traditionally described the difference between mathematics and 
the sciences in terms of their means of verification of claims. While claims to scientific truths are 
verified by experimentation, claims to logical and mathematical truth are verified by proof. 
Scholars like Bell (1976), de Villiers (1990), Hanna (1982), and Hersh (1993) have alluded to 
this function of proof. Bell (1976, p. 24) indicates that the role of proof is verification or 
justification of the truth of a proposition. Hanna (1990, p. 9) indicates that ‘proofs that (only) 
prove’ show that a theorem is true. In mathematics education scholarship, the verification 
function of proof has often, also been given a subjective interpretation according to which proofs 
are done to convince or persuade humans of the truth of a statement. Thus Mason (1982) spoke 
of proving as convincing oneself, convincing a friend, and convincing an enemy. Harel & 
Sowder (1998) conceived of “proof schemes” as oriented to ascertaining the truth of a statement 
for oneself and to persuading others of the truth of a statement.  
 Thus one function of proof is to show that a proposition is demonstrably true in 
mathematics. The truth of the statement being what matters, it might be just as good to know one 
proof than to know another one, or perhaps to know only that a proof exists (Bass, 2009).  But 
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classroom work serves not only to represent knowledge but also to promote and demonstrate 
students’ learning. In appraising the work done, a teacher needs to attend not just to whether the 
truth of a statement has been established but also to whether the audience stood the chance of 
being, and perhaps was, convinced of the truth of that statement. This presents a set of 
contingencies associated with a teacher’s chance to effect a transaction between the proving 
work done and the claim that the statement is known as true. Note how these contingencies play 
out in the following scenario. 
The animated story “The Midpoint Quadrilateral6” provides grounds to consider the role 
that this verification function of proof in mathematics can play in mathematics instruction. In the 
story, the teacher has tasked the class with proving that the midpoint quadrilateral, the dual, of an 
isosceles trapezoid is a rhombus (see Figure 2). A student, Kappa, attempts an argument that uses 
two observations made by other students. One observation, made earlier that day by Beta, 
asserted that the midpoint quadrilateral of an isosceles trapezoid has congruent consecutive sides. 
The other, a conjecture made the day before by Lambda, asserted that the dual of any 
quadrilateral is always a parallelogram. Kappa added that since the dual is at least a 
parallelogram, “opposite sides are congruent” and since also “sides next to each other are 
congruent” then “all [sides are] congruent. So it has to be a rhombus.” In the story, the teacher 
denies Kappa the opportunity to use Lambda’s conjecture to prove this claim, since Lambda’s 
conjecture had not been proved yet. Then Kappa spends most of his time looking for a proof that 
will verify Lambda’s conjecture. The actions of the teacher in the story show one way in which a 
teacher could be responsive to the notion that to accept a statement as true, the existence of a 
proof is needed. This notion compels the teacher to reject the application of the statement that 
                                                
6 This animated story can be seen in ThEMaT’s Researchers’ Hub, http://grip.umich.edu/themat 
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any midpoint quadrilateral is a parallelogram because this statement has not been proved yet. 
Additionally, the notion propels Kappa to search for a proof for the statement, whose existence 
would eventually enable him to use the statement that Lambda had conjectured. The function of 
proof as verification could assist the teacher in allocating value to two episodes: (1) his rejection 
of Kappa’s first argument and (2) Kappa’s later work searching for a proof of Lambda’s 
conjecture. The story also exemplifies how a teacher may be caught in between the possibility 
that an argument that convinces a student might not quite satisfy mathematical standards to be 
accepted as a verification of a truth. 
 
 
Figure 2: The dual of an isosceles trapezoid is a rhombus 
 
 In terms of the theory of instructional exchanges, the “Midpoint quadrilateral” scenario 
illustrates that a teacher may be confronted with the need to exchange two unequal terms. On the 
one hand there are chunks of mathematical work such as the work made by Kappa to prove that 
the midpoint quadrilateral of an isosceles trapezoid is a rhombus. On the other hand there are (1) 
the status that the teacher can attribute to that assertion as representations of knowledge and (2) 
what the teacher can acknowledge about the students’ state of conviction about that assertion. As 
regards the statement, that the midpoint quadrilateral of an isosceles trapezoid is a rhombus, to 
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the extent that its proof hinges on a statement whose theorem status is yet unclear, the teacher 
does not feel entitled to give to it the status of proof that that Kappa’s work seeks. And yet, 
Kappa himself appeared to be convinced by his argument, later seeking through a “proof” of 
Lambda’s conjecture to convince the teacher. The various contingencies associated with whether 
the work done amounts to verification, conviction, or both of them span a possible tension in 
teaching: if the work done to verify mathematically does not convince students, is its value 
sufficient? Likewise if the work done to convince students does not amount to a mathematical 
verification, is it worth enough?  
But conviction and verification are not the only functions of proof that could be used to 
allocate value to classroom work. In fact, De Villiers (1990) has critiqued this reduction of proof 
to verification or conviction adducing that, in mathematical work, a mathematician’s inner 
conviction of the truth of a statement often precedes his decision to prove. Yet the existence and 
importance of proof in mathematics is warranted on other functions that it serves.  
 
The work of proving may count as explanation or understanding of a statement 
Mathematical statements are connected with other statements by way of the concepts they 
predicate about. A second set of stakes of the work of proving is associated with the 
contingencies of on the one hand explaining mathematically why a statement is true and on the 
other hand, of attesting to students’ understanding of what the statement means.  
Hanna (1983), building on the work of philosopher Mark Steiner (1978), has contrasted 
the function of proof as verification of a statement with the role of proof as explanation of a 
statement. The word explanation here alludes to showing how the asserted property of a 
mathematical concept coheres and connects with the known properties of that mathematical 
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concept. A proof can have the function of explaining why a theorem is a reasonable thing to say 
about a known concept by showing how the statement of a theorem coheres and connects with 
the key properties of the concepts involved in the proof. In this sense a proof can be an important 
tool for representing mathematical knowledge as made of connected, as opposed to disconnected, 
concepts and procedures. This explanatory function of proof has also been given a subjective 
interpretation in the notion that proofs can help students understand the meaning of mathematical 
ideas. Thus Hanna (2000) has expressed support for this function of proof in preferring proofs 
that explain over proofs that merely prove and in noting that the most important role of proof is 
to promote students’ understanding of mathematics. Knuth (2002) has echoed it arguing to 
teachers that proofs are valuable because they can help students understand mathematics.   
 
   
 
Figure 3. Steps of the construction of an angle bisector in the animation “Constructions...” 
 
This function of proof as explanation is illustrated in the animated story “Constructions, 
Theorems, and Corollaries.” The story shows a class of students who have learned a procedure to 
construct an angle bisector with compass and straightedge: They draw an arc of a circle centered 
at the angle’s vertex and that intersects the two legs of the angle, then using the same arc they 
center the compass on each of those intersection points and draw two new arcs inside the angle; 
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where these two arcs intersect they make a point and draw a ray emanating from the angle’s 
vertex and passing through this last point (see Figure 3). In the story, after reviewing that 
procedure, the teacher invites the class to develop the proof that the ray so constructed is indeed 
the angle bisector of the given angle. The proof revisits the steps of the construction. Segments 
are drawn to join the intersection of the last two arcs with each of the intersections of the first 
two arcs with the legs of the angle. In that way two triangles are formed that have as a common 
side a segment contained in the constructed, putative angle bisector (see Figure 4). To show that 
the ray is indeed an angle bisector, a proof is done that the two angles it makes with each of the 
original angle’s sides are congruent. The fact that the same arc had been used originally to 
intersect the two legs of the angle is used to justify that one side in each of two triangles is 
congruent; a similar feature about the second set of arcs is used similarly. The congruence of the 
two triangles thus entails the congruence of corresponding angles. The proof thus uses congruent 
triangles to explain why the procedure of construction of an angle bisector produces two 
congruent angles. The proof relates the procedure of construction to some known properties such 
as equal distance and congruent triangles. It also creates connections with some more complex 
figures such as the rhombus. In fact the story shows how the proof of the construction naturally 
creates conditions for students to notice properties about the diagonals of the rhombus, such as 
the property that says that diagonals of a rhombus bisect opposite angles, which the teacher 
introduces as warranted by the same proof. 
What is at stake in doing this proof? Certainly not how to do the construction procedure, 
which had been learned earlier and which could be performed without knowledge of its proof (in 
fact, it quite often is). We argue that there is more at stake than the verification that the 
construction provides the correct output. At stake also are the connections between this 
Functions of proof—Herbst, Miyakawa, and Chazan 
 15 
procedure and other pieces of knowledge—such as triangle congruence, rhombi and their 
properties—connections that may tie the construction procedure to the edifice of declarative 
geometric knowledge. The work of the students in the story, noticing what the givens are and 
translating steps of the construction to steps of the proof seems instrumental to making those 
connections. Likewise the observations that students make of how the construction with its 
auxiliary lines resembles a rhombus, serve to further cement those connections.  
 
Figure 4. The proof of the angle bisector construction connects with the notion of rhombus. 
 
Hanna has cautioned that not every proof explains; in fact it is plausible that even proofs 
that are explanatory in the mathematical sense of showing connections with other concepts, may 
fail to create in students the sense that they understand what is connected with that statement. On 
the other hand it is also plausible that the work that eventually accomplishes students’ 
understanding of those connections might be questionable as a legitimate representation of what 
mathematicians would give as explanation. 
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  The work of proving can thus have the exchange value of explanation—it can achieve a 
clarification of the conceptual grounds on which something may be true or false and prompt a 
statement to change status from being obvious to being a claim in need of support. The example 
of the “Constructions ... ” story illustrates that the work of proving can have the exchange value 
of showing that specific connections between procedure (construction) and concept (rhombus, 
triangle congruency) exist. But the management required of the teacher includes more than 
making room for work that can count as a mathematical explanation of connections between 
concepts. It also requires that the teacher can ensure that students understand those connections. 
For a teacher to be able to exchange the work done for the claim that the statement has been 
explained there thus seems to be a need to attend both to what the explanation itself has as far as 
connections between concepts and to what the explanation does to students’ activity as far as 
enabling them to (feel like they can) do things that they might not have thought of doing before. 
The various contingencies associated with whether the work done amounts to explanation, 
understanding, or both of them span a possible tension in teaching: if the work done to explain 
mathematically does not help students understand, is its value sufficient? Likewise if the work 
done to help students understand does not amount to a mathematical explanation, is it worth 
enough? 
 
The work of proving may count as discovery of a reasonable statement 
A third set of stakes of the work of proving is associated with the contingencies of on the 
one hand representing a rational discovery of a mathematical statement and on the other hand, of 
attesting to students’ perception that the statement is plausible or reasonable. The management 
work of the teacher, effecting a transaction of the work done for the claim that the statement is 
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reasonable, includes not only to attest that the statement can be produced by reasoning but also 
that students can reason their way through to the statement.  
The work of Imre Lakatos (1976) has illustrated the notion that proofs and refutations are 
part and parcel of the generation of mathematical knowledge: Proof is not merely a process done 
after the formulation of statements but actually a process that enables the production, the shaping 
of plausible statements. With his study of the history of Euler’s theorem for polyhedra, Lakatos 
illustrates how the work of proving a naïve conjecture can lead to formulating a more precise 
conjecture and even defining precisely the concepts (e.g., polyhedron) alluded to in the naïve 
conjecture. De Villiers (1990) also alludes to this function of proof by noting that 
mathematicians working on advanced areas of mathematics such as non Euclidean geometries 
would be hard pressed if they had to depend only on intuition or experimentation to conjecture 
statements and only used proof to verify them. Hanna & Jahnke’s (1996) discussion of the 
exploration function of proof is also captured by this discovery function—in particular as proof 
plays the role of exploring the consequences of a definition or assumption. 
In the story “Constructions, Theorems, and Corollaries” described above, the task of 
proving that the ray constructed is indeed an angle bisector leads the class to consider two 
adjacent isosceles triangles, that they prove congruent (see Figure 4). The initial interest in that 
triangle congruence is to show that the two angles at the vertex A, (∠PAR and ∠QAR) are 
congruent by being corresponding parts of a triangle congruency. But when the class’s attention 
is turned to recognizing that the quadrilateral APRQ is a rhombus, they notice that the 
congruency also entails that AR is the angle bisector of ∠PRQ. The work of doing a proof 
produces reasonable statements that might not have been anticipated before.  
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The prior example shows how one important stake to be claimed by way of having done a 
proof is that a statement, which emerges from the proof, is, by virtue of the proof, reasonable. 
Likewise this function of proof also gives resources for the teacher to appraise what students do 
when they reason deductively. A teacher can call on this discovery function of proof to appraise 
the work of a student (or of the students with the help of the teacher) arriving deductively at a 
statement. 
 
Figure 5. What could be proved about this figure? 
 
The animated story “A Proof about Rectangles” illustrates how a student could engage in 
the work of proving to find out what is possible to claim. We argue that a teacher could use the 
“discovery” function of proof to appraise such student work. At the very beginning of the story 
the teacher has asked the class to think about a rectangle as in Figure 5 where it is known that E 
is the midpoint of segment DC and that ∠AEB is a right angle. The teacher asks what can be 
proved about the sides AB and BC. Rho contributes his thinking: “Well the corner triangles are 
isosceles so BC is half of DC which is the same of … so, I know… we could show it’s half of 
the other….” Rho seems to see that right triangles ADE and BCE are not only congruent to 
each other but also isosceles which (conceivably added to the facts that AB = DC = DE + EC, 
and that DE ≅ EC) suggest to him that AB is twice as long as BC. The teacher answers, “I know 
what you mean, and that is what we will be proving.” The work Rho has done has value for the 
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teacher who knows that Rho finds the statement that AB = 2 BC a plausible thing to conclude 
from the givens.  
This discovery function of proof stresses how the work of proving can be the source of 
mathematical propositions. In terms of the theory of instructional exchanges, this encourages us 
to look at the work the teacher does or the students do to come up with or introduce a new piece 
of mathematical knowledge, a definition or a theorem and to place special value to this work 
when it represents mathematical knowledge as reasonable (Ball & Bass, 2003). The various 
contingencies associated with whether the work done amounts to representing a rational 
discovery, coming up with a plausible statement, or both of them span a possible tension in 
teaching: if the work done to represent a rational discovery does not contribute to students’ 
capacity to propose the statement, is the rational derivation sufficiently valuable? Likewise if the 
work done to enable students to come up with a statement employs not deductive reasoning but 
only intuition or empirical work, is the rationality of mathematical practice sufficiently well 
represented? 
 
The work of proving may count as negotiation or demonstration of standards for communication 
 A fourth exchange value on the work of proving is the claim that a mathematical 
argument has been communicated. This requires the teacher to manage an exchange that involves 
not only whether the argument has been communicated but also whether students know how to 
communicate it. In his article “The role and function of proof in mathematics,” Michael de 
Villiers (1990) points to the importance of proof as a locus of mathematical debate. Building on 
positions taken by Davis & Hersh (1986) as well as by René Thom (1971), De Villiers argues 
cogently that the practice of constructing a proof stages the ongoing debate of what counts as a 
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mathematical argument within the mathematical community. This position about the function of 
proof as communication has some resonance also in Hyman Bass’s (2009) observation that 
mathematicians don’t quite do proofs (in the formal sense) but rather concern themselves with 
making other mathematical “practitioners convinced of the existence of proofs” (p. 3). Most of 
the time the work of showing that a proof exists, for example in communicating a result through 
a journal publication, includes some negotiation of how much about the argument is needed in 
order to communicate the result as one for which a proof exists. The recent story of Fermat’s last 
theorem, in particular the fact that the result initially claimed by Andrew Wiles in a lecture in 
1993 was eventually accepted only after firmed up in a paper by Richard Taylor and Andrew 
Wiles (1995), which filled a gap in the original proof (Faltings, 1995), attests to how the work of 
showing that a proof exists functions as a stage for the mathematical community to negotiate 
what would count as enough of such demonstration.  
 Any proof done in class can therefore have as an exchange value not just that it lays claim 
on the truth or on the explanation of the statement proved but also that it instantiates the nature of 
what counts as proof. Along those lines, the work of proving can be accounted for as 
demonstration of how much students have internalized and can reuse or transform existing 
standards for proving.  
 The animated story “The Square,” in which students discuss Alpha’s claim that in a 
square angle bisectors meet at a point because they are the diagonals, eventually showcases how 
a classroom could stage a debate on the nature of mathematical argument as the class deals with 
showing that a proof exists for the claim that diagonals of a square bisect opposite angles. To 
argue that the diagonal of a square bisects opposite angles Lambda adduces that a diagonal splits 
the square into two congruent isosceles triangles. Lambda adds that the same thing is the case 
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with the other diagonal. Thus Lambda’s argument unpacks Alpha’s argument (by showing why 
one could say that a diagonal is an angle bisector) and glosses over some details (e.g., it avoids 
showing in detail that both diagonals are angle bisectors and it overlooks the formal distinction 
that angle bisectors are rays while diagonals are segments; see Figure 6). Lambda’s argument 
illustrates the communication function of mathematical proof. The story also illustrates, how 
such attempts at communicating an argument might not be perceived as enough demonstration. 
In fact in the story, immediately after Lambda provides his argument, the teacher asks for a 
proof, what motivates Lambda to say, “I just did that.” When pit against the background of what 
proofs usually look like in geometry classes (for example as shown in the latter part of the story 
“A proof about rectangles”) one can understand why Lambda’s argument might seem to some as 
not abiding by enough of the standards for communication of a proof. 
 
Figure 6. Diagonals of a square bisect angles. 
 
In terms of the theory of instructional exchanges these observations help put forward the notion 
that work done to produce a proof can have the exchange value of communication. This 
exchange value puts a premium on the extent to which the work done creates a representation of 
the process of negotiating a mathematical argument. Since the work of the teacher includes 
creating (with students) representations of the mathematics to be learned and since this 
mathematics to be learned includes the practice of producing proofs acceptable to a community, 
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some of the work to be done includes transacting elements of an argument in formation so that 
the linguistic tokens useful to demand and comply with standards for argument can be claimed to 
have been publicly represented. In particular, language uses adapted to requesting further 
argument (e.g., “how can you say that… ”) or to avoiding further argument (e.g., “it follows 
easily that…,” “without loss of generality, let’s assume… ”) can be the elements of knowledge at 
stake to be exchanged for the work of showing that a proof exists. 
On the other hand, to the extent that performance also has to show that students have 
acquired the target knowledge, it is understandable that moments of negotiation of what counts 
as an acceptable mathematical argument, however they are implemented, might be followed by 
periods of use and transformation of those negotiated features. In particular, it is understandable 
that students in the high school geometry course would be asked to use particular forms (such as 
the two column form; see Herbst, 2002) for writing their proofs, that they would do problems 
where they practice using such forms, and that future negotiations of new arguments might be 
done against the background of such forms (see Weiss, Herbst, & Chen, 2008).  
The various contingencies associated with whether the work done amounts to negotiating 
the communication of a particular mathematical argument, employing learned standards for such 
communication, or both of them span a possible tension in teaching: if the work done to 
communicate an argument in a mathematically acceptable way does not contribute to students’ 
sense that they know what a good proof is, is that work sufficient? Likewise, if the work done to 
enable students to practice and transform standards for communication of an argument produces 
a communication that is reiterative, redundant, or protracted, is the work done mathematically 
justifiable? 
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The work of proving may count as systematizing mathematical knowledge 
 A fifth exchange value on the work of proving is the claim that a mathematical statement 
has been incorporated into a theory or mathematical system of postulates, definitions, and other 
theorems. This has been referred to as the systematizing function of proof by De Villiers (1990) 
as well as by Bell (1976) and also alluded to by Hanna & Jahnke’s (1996) “incorporation” 
function of proof, whereby a proof may incorporate a known proposition into a different theory, 
thus enabling the representation of that proposition in a new light. Accordingly, the work of 
producing a proof of a statement may be accounted for as showing that a statement is deducible 
or derivable from some other statements.  While research grounded on the van Hiele levels of 
geometric thought has shown that high school geometry students tend not to achieve 
understanding of this aspect of mathematical rigor (Usiskin, 1982) the expectation that students 
will learn that geometric knowledge is organized as a system of axioms, theorems, and 
definitions has continued to be present in geometry textbooks. This expectation is present, at the 
very least, in the fact that a large part of the plane geometry material that students learn in high 
school geometry is material they already know; however, they are getting to know it differently, 
through deductive means. One might expect that teachers would create opportunities for students 
to show that they understand how new statements relate to known statements, including 
postulates, definitions, and theorems.  
 The story "Postulates and theorems on parallel lines" illustrates a kind of work that could 
be accounted for or justified by recourse to this systematization function of proof.  In this story, 
the teacher first gives as a postulate the statement that a transversal that intersects two parallel 
lines creates congruent corresponding angles. Then she proves as a theorem the statement about 
the congruence of alternate-interior angles determined by a transversal line that intersects parallel 
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lines. The proof given for this theorem shows this statement as deducible from the one offered as 
postulate earlier. Later on in the same lesson, however, the teacher says they could just as well 
have taken as a postulate that alternate interior angles are congruent and use it to prove the 
theorem that parallel lines imply corresponding angles are congruent. In one of the variants of 
this story, the teacher asks students to disregard the earlier postulate, proposes as postulate what 
they had last proved as theorem, and sets about to prove as theorem what had earlier been offered 
as a postulate. In this way the story stresses that a proof establishes a logical relationship of 
deducibility between postulate and theorem, adding to the knowledge of those statements 
knowledge about the organization of a mathematical theory.  
Other variants of this story show that students may not necessarily understand what the 
point could be of changing postulates and proving as a theorem something that was before a 
postulate: In version C of the story, a student reacts to the proposition that parallel lines imply 
congruent alternate interior angles by saying “I don’t get it, that’s a theorem;” someone else 
reacts to the proposition that they would prove as a theorem that parallel lines imply congruent 
corresponding angles by saying “that’s a postulate.” With expressions like these the story 
illustrates the difficulties that students might have understanding the nature of a mathematical 
system or differentiating the notion of truth from that of deducibility. In this way the story 
illustrates how the systematization function of proof can be useful for a teacher to justify why 
spend time proving that by taking different statements as postulates one might be able to prove 
different theorems. The story also illustrates that students may have difficulty accepting that the 
same statement may be a postulate in one system and a theorem in another (see Figure 7a and 
7b). 
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Figure 7a. One possible systematization. Figure 7b. Another possible systematization. 
 
This function of proof, to show the dependency of a proposition on others, also offers the teacher 
a resource to manage the work of allocating value to arguments that students produce even when 
they might not have done enough to establish the truth of all the propositions that sustain the one 
whose truth they claim. The systematization function of proof can help the teacher manage 
allocating value when the work done shows that the student knows how the provability of a 
statement depends on the truth of other statements. An example of this was provided above 
when, in the context of “The Midpoint Quadrilateral,” we discussed Kappa’s proof of the claim 
that the dual of an isosceles trapezoid is a rhombus. 
 From the perspective of the theory of instructional exchanges this systematization 
function of proof is important to show that inasmuch as classroom work has to create a 
representation of mathematics, the work of doing of a proof serves to represent the architecture 
of mathematical theories. The doing of a particular proof in class may have as its exchange value 
the representation of the deducibility of a given proposition from other propositions. As a 
resource for the teacher this function of proof identifies a source of values that can be used to 
appraise the work of showing the dependence of a theorem on other theorems or the equivalence 
of two propositions. It also provides resources for a teacher to appraise work students do when 
they conceive of the architecture of a proof but are unable to provide all the details. But it also 
permits to anticipate dilemmas a teacher may need to manage. The various contingencies 
associated with whether the work done amounts to representing the deducibility of a statement 
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from other statements, eliciting students’ understanding of what a mathematical system is, or 
both of them span a possible tension in teaching: If the work done to show that one or more 
propositions entail another one makes students think they can just assume propositions to be true, 
is the work done justifiable? (see Nachlieli & Herbst, 2009). Likewise if the work done to enable 
students to learn what a mathematical system is includes making them take as postulates 
statements that are not postulates in mathematics, is the architecture of mathematical theories 
appropriately represented? 
 
The work of proving may count as containing or showing a mathematical technique 
A sixth exchange value for the work of proving is the claim that a mathematical 
technique (procedure, method) has been represented and/or learnt. Rav (1999) brings up a 
function of proof in mathematics that has not been addressed by any of those listed above: Proofs 
are bearers of mathematical knowledge. He argues that the entire mathematical know-how is 
embedded in the collection of proofs. This is one of reasons why mathematicians are keen to 
attend to the proofs rather than only to the theorem statements when they read scholarly articles. 
In their commentary on Rav’s (1999) contribution, Hanna & Barbeau (2008) further show how 
relevant this function of proof is in mathematics education by exemplifying how school-level 
proofs are bearers of mathematical knowledge. By participating in the proof of a statement, 
techniques become part of the body of mathematical knowledge. In arguing that the work of 
proving could be justified on account of creating a context where to anchor particular 
mathematical techniques or practices we call attention to the teacher’s possibility to use the work 
of proving to (1) represent a particular mathematical technique and (2) observe students’ 
capacity to use a technique.  
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   The story “Intersection of Medians” provides a good example of how a proof could be 
used to represent a technique. In this story the teacher shows that the intersection of medians in a 
triangle is a point such that it determines, with the three vertices of the triangle, three triangles of 
equal area. The proof that the teacher gives shows the statement as a consequence of applying 
the notion that one median splits a triangle into two triangles of equal area and that when one 
subtracts equal areas from equal areas one gets equal areas (see also Herbst, 2005, 2006). While 
the statement proved is not obvious it may not be highly consequential either. But the proof is 
important in its capacity to show how a seemingly obvious statement, the additive rule for areas, 
underpins a powerful method: To compare the areas of two figures, see if they can be 
represented as juxtapositions of simpler figures that can be matched. In the story, the teacher 
makes very little explicit about why he thinks this is “a cool proof” (see Figure 8) but the fact 
that it bears this important technique could be a justification for why having students learn it. 
 
 
Figure 8. The centroid splits a triangle into three equal areas. 
 
While Rav’s (1999) article has been a landmark in the scholarly literature on proof in 
mathematics education, one could hardly argue the novelty of its claim to teachers of geometry. 
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Geometry instruction, at least in the United States, shows a concentration of proof problems for 
students in the first half of the course, when students study parallelism and congruence. Two key 
techniques could be shown to account for most of the proof exercises students do in this period: 
the technique of finding corresponding angles determined by a transversal cutting parallel lines 
and the technique of finding corresponding triangles that could be proved congruent. As Herbst 
& Brach (2006) have noted, the proofs that students do are rarely proofs of important 
propositions; but these proof exercises always stage applications of a technique for proving. In 
terms of the theory of instructional exchanges, then, this function of a proof underscores that the 
work of doing of a proof may be instrumental to representing a technique, which is the 
knowledge at stake in that work. One can understand why a teacher might then ask students to 
prove a particular theorem in a particular way or why a teacher might want to show a different 
proof of a theorem that had already been proved before: To do these things helps represent new 
techniques or helps demonstrate how those techniques can be put to use in doing authentic 
mathematical work.   
The various contingencies associated with whether the proving work done amounts to 
representing a mathematical technique, giving students opportunity to show they have learned a 
technique, or both of them, span a possible tension in teaching: If the work done to prove a 
proposition allocates too much attention to the proposition proved in detriment of the technique 
used, would this put the value of the time spent doing the proof at risk? Conversely, ad hoc proof 
exercises for learning or practicing a technique could keep these techniques in focus, but their 
lack of grounds on an authentic problem of the discipline could put their mathematical value at 
risk.  
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The work of proving may count as establishing the theoretical predictability of an empirical fact 
A seventh exchange value for the work of proving is the claim that a mathematical theory 
can predict an empirical fact. From a reflection on the relationship between mathematical proof 
and empirical sciences such as physics, Hanna and Jahnke (1996) identified three functions of 
proof. Two of them (exploring and incorporating) have been covered by two of the functions 
described above (discovery and systematization, respectively). The third function of proof 
identified by Hanna and Jahnke (1996) is the construction of an empirical theory: Proofs are 
crucial elements for constructing an empirical theory. An empirical theory (e.g., mechanics) can 
be seen as a system of propositions, each of which asserts empirical statements of fact, connected 
by deductive relationships that are established by proofs. This function of proof is particularly 
important as it helps relate theoretical knowledge of mathematics to some empirical aspects of 
students’ mathematical activity including drawing geometric diagrams, sketching graphs, 
estimating calculations, and so on.  
The story “The Tangent Circle” showcases how the work of proving could help establish 
the theoretical predictability of a successful drawing, which had originally been achieved 
through trial and error, hands-on experiences with a diagram. The story shows how a class works 
on the problem of drawing a circle tangent to two intersecting lines at two specified points. 
Through interacting with the diagram, the class discovers what could be seen as a collection of 
empirical facts: if the points of tangency are chosen equidistant from the point of intersection 
they succeed in drawing a circle tangent at those points but when those points appear not 
equidistant, the circle turns out to be not tangent (see Figure 9). At the end of the story, the 
teacher indicates that only a proof could confirm that such empirical success is mathematically 
valid. Indeed, a proof that two right triangles (with a common hypotenuse at the segment whose 
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extremes are the circle's center and the intersection of the lines) are congruent if and only if their 
legs are congruent establishes the tangency of such circle as a consequence of Euclidean 
geometry. In this case, the proof here enables a connection between the empirical fact of having 




Figure 9a. When points are not equidistant the 
tangent circle cannot be drawn. 
Figure 9b. When points are equidistant the 
tangent circle can be drawn. 
 
From the perspective of the theory of instructional exchanges, this function of proof is 
important in high school geometry as a way to organize a disorganized set of concomitant facts 
about diagrams that might be known from earlier courses and through empirical or perceptual 
means. While students may already be able to lay claim on many of the truths about geometric 
figures after their earlier experiences with geometry, the high school geometry class puts them 
again as stakes of the learning process. If they exist as prior knowledge they need to be 
“forgotten” and reconstructed, this time deductively (González, 2009). At the same time, 
diagrams continue to provide perceptual or empirical grounds for plausibility (Herbst, 2004; 
Polya, 1954). Thus just like in physics, proof can articulate relationships between possible facts, 
effectively representing possible facts as predictions based on known facts and deductive 
inferences from those known facts; predictions that can be confronted and perhaps confirmed by 
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empirical interactions with diagrams (see Herbst, 2003, for an example). Such function of proof 
helps the teacher represent geometry as a theoretical field of study and thus underscores how 
measurement and proof can coexist in the work that students do in class. This function of proof 
helps represent the relationships between the theoretical notion of geometric figure and its 
concrete representations (in diagrams or other forms) as a case of the relationships between 
theory and field of experience (see also Boero, Garuti, and Mariotti, 1996). The teacher can use 
this function of proof to account for the work of proving: Statements that are known to be true 
through intuitive or empirical means can still be proved in order to show that they are predictably 
true.  
The various contingencies associated with whether the proving work done amounts to 
establishing the predictability of an empirical fact, enabling students to know what to expect 
from an experience, or both of them span a possible tension in teaching: If the work done to 
prove a proposition allocates too much attention to the conclusion established in detriment of the 
necessity established between givens and conclusion, would this put the value of the time spent 
doing the proof at risk? Conversely, problems that give students the opportunity to predict 
empirical facts given some empirical conditions might elicit their use of any prediction method 
thus possibly compromising the mathematical value of the work done. 
 
Conclusion and Implications 
Seven functions of proof in mathematical activity have been reviewed and discussed: 
verification, explanation, discovery, communication, systematization, containment of techniques, 
and theoretical prediction of empirical observations. The paper illustrates with scenarios of 
geometry instruction how a teacher could use those functions of proof to allocate value to 
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different kinds of proving work. Those scenarios are useful not only because they permit to 
illustrate the more general point that, as a diverse set of performances, the work of proving can 
be valued along a many-valued scale. They are useful also because they permit a common way 
of inquiring on the perspective of teachers.  
Indeed, the functions of proof discussed above constitute a hypothesis: That various 
stakes of knowledge are to be claimed through the work done in class--the truth of a proposition, 
the connections between concepts, the reasonableness of mathematical propositions, the norms 
of mathematical argument, the relationship between propositions, specific techniques for 
handling mathematical concepts, and the relationships between mathematical theory and 
concrete representations. Those stakes of knowledge are important elements of mathematical 
practice and knowledge. But, do practitioners perceive them as important?  
Our discussion of functions of proof based on the theory of instructional exchanges has 
made heavy use of the hypothesis that a teacher is obligated not only to mathematics (he or she 
has the responsibility to represent the discipline) but also to students (he or she needs to promote 
and certify their learning). That theoretical examination led us to derive possible dilemmas that a 
teacher may need to manage as s/he manages the exchanges between work done and the values 
to be claimed. The analysis permits to ask further empirical questions. Do teachers perceive 
those dilemmas? And, how do they value instructional actions such as those observed in the 
illustrative scenarios where teachers attempt to make room for work of proving that could be 
accounted for in these many ways? The analysis also provides a plausible justification for the 
relatively small place that proof actually plays in classrooms—the existence of those dilemmas 
might account for why only some of the work of proving exemplified here actually takes place in 
real geometry classrooms.  
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